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“The story of Fred Korematsu, for me, is very much a story about the 
story of so many Americans at this moment in time .  .  .   These Ameri-
cans are not sure whether America wants them and whether America will 
allow them to stay and how they fit into the fabric of this land, and yet are 
willing to fight for their place . . .  [T]hat, for me, is the most American 
thing to do, is to declare yourself.”1
“Upon signing the first travel ban, entitled Protecting the Nation From 
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States: ‘We all know what 
that means.’”2
Introduction
On June 25, 2017, the Korematsu precedent was nearly dead.3  No courts 
dared to refer to Korematsu as good case law.  The dark history of Japanese 
American internment during World War II plagues the Supreme Court as 
one of the worst decisions ever made, alongside Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred 
Scott v. Sanford.  Justice Samuel Alito referred to Korematsu as one of the 
“great constitutional tragedies that our country has experienced.”4  During 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation, Senator Lindsay Graham asked her 
if she believed Korematsu was wrongly decided.5  She responded, “[i]t was, 
sir . . .  It is inconceivable to me today that a decision permitting the detention 
and arrest of an individual solely on the basis of their race would be con-
sidered appropriate by our government.”6  Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts 
stated, “[Korematsu] is widely recognized as not having precedential value.”7
Yet, on June 26, 2017, the Korematsu spirit was revived by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii.  In a 5–4 decision, Chief Justice John 
Roberts, writing for the majority, held that the Trump administration had 
provided “a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis 
review” and validated Proclamation 9645, commonly known as the “travel 
1. Sarah Larson, “More Perfect,” Where “Radiolab” Meets the Supreme Courts, 
The New Yorker (Oct. 12, 2017) https://www.newyorker.com/culture/podcast-dept/more- 
perfect-where-radiolab-meets-the-supreme-court.
2. Richard Wolf, Travel Ban Lexicon: From Candidate Donald Trump’s Campaign 
Promises to President Trump’s Tweets, USA Today (Apr. 24, 2018) https://www. usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2018/04/24/travel-ban-donald-trump-campaign-promises- 
president-tweets/542504002 (quoting Donald Trump).
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Serial No. J-109–56, 109th Cong. 418 (2006), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-109shrg25429/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25429.pdf.
5. Transcript of the Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, 69, (2009) https://epic.
org/privacy/sotomayor/sotomoyor_transcript.pdf.
6. Id at 69–70.
7. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Serial No. J- 109–37, 
109th Congress 241 (2005), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/
GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf.
452019 DISARMING JACKSON’S (RE)LOADED WEAPON
ban” or the “Muslim Ban.”8  The travel ban “indefinitely suspends the issuance 
of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to applicants from the Muslim-ma-
jority countries Libya, Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—plus North Korea 
and Venezuela.”9  Because of President Trump’s travel ban, countless Amer-
ican lives have been deeply affected: spouses have been separated; children 
have been unable to reunite with their parents; students feel hopeless about 
gaining employment in the United States; and many more people feel like 
prisoners who are unable to leave the country for fear of not being allowed 
back in despite their legal status.10
In Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United States, he 
refers to the majority’s opinion as a “loaded weapon ready for the hand of 
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”11 
More than seventy years later, the Supreme Court reloaded this weapon and 
handed its instruction guide to the president.  The Supreme Court validated 
the executive branch’s ability to use national security concerns as a mask for 
racial and religious animus against Muslims and people from Muslim-major-
ity nations.12
In conjunction with the travel ban, anti-immigrant policies have pro-
liferated.  Despite the fact that Japanese internment camps are ghost towns, 
new internment camps are utilized for undocumented refugees attempting 
to find safe shelter in the United States.13  Furthermore, the travel ban affects 
over 135 million people all over the world.14  People from Libya, Iran, Soma-
lia, Syria, Yemen, North Korea, and Venezuela are categorically blocked from 
seeking asylum no matter how dangerous their living conditions are.15
The importance of neutralizing Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii cannot 
be overstated.  Their precedents are dangerous to keep alive for all vulnerable 
and minority communities.  The United States houses one-fifth of the world’s 
8. Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17–965, 585 U.S. 38 (2018).
9. Rick Gladstone & Satoshi Sugiyama, Trump’s Travel Ban: How It Works and 
Who Is Affected, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/
americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-works.html.
10. Ashley Dejean and Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, I Feel Like a Prisoner in the Most 
Free Country in the World, Mother Jones (Mar. 7, 2018) https://www.motherjones.com/poli-
tics/2018/03/we-asked-how-the-travel-ban-changed-peoples-lives-heres-what-they-told-us.
11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944).
12. See generally, Amy D. Sorkin, What Does Trump’s New Travel Ban Mean For 
The Supreme Court?, The New Yorker (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
amy-davidson-sorkin/what-does-trumps-new-travel-ban-mean-for-the-supreme-court 
(“Indeed, it is not that much of a stretch to imagine a second Trump Administration, or 
another future Administration like it, with a different lineup of Justices, citing Korematsu 
to justify the denial of rights to immigrants, or to any Americans.”).
13. Alexa Ura, Japanese-Americans Imprisoned at Texas Internment Camp in 1940s 
Watch Border Crisis Unfold with Heavy Hearts, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/22/texas-immigration-japanese-americans- crystal-
city.
14. Gladstone & Sugiyama, supra note 9.
15. Id.
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migrants.16  With President Trump’s vitriolic rhetoric against immigrants, par-
ticularly Muslims and Muslim Americans, he draws an eerie parallel between 
himself and former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who sanctioned 
the Japanese American internment camps in the name of national security.
This Note illustrates that the Supreme Court made a mistake in uphold-
ing Proclamation 9645.  The Court should have nullified the Korematsu 
precedent and the travel ban.  It is implausible for a Trump v. Hawaii prec-
edent to survive in the context of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld17, the Non-Detention 
Act18, and the myriad of Congressional and Presidential declarations19 offi-
cially apologizing for their actions in establishing internment camps during 
World War II.
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I begins with a detailed history 
of the Korematsu case to provide context for the connections between the 
Court’s ruling in Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii.  Part II reviews the Trump 
v. Hawaii litigation and its parallels with Korematsu.  Part III focuses on how 
the Supreme Court conducted an incorrect analysis of Korematsu and how 
the spirit of Korematsu should have remained in the anticanon of constitu-
tional history.  Part IV examines Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hedges v. Obama, and 
Ziglar v. Abassi to mitigate the Trump v. Hawaii precedent.  Finally, Part V 
presents legislative recommendations on how to prevent racialized detention 
camps from being reinstituted during times of war.  The Note concludes by 
reiterating that measures can be made by Congress to prevent the atrocity of 
unlawful detention of United States citizens, such as the immigration deten-
tion centers, from reoccurring.
I. History and Context for Korematsu v. united states
A. Pearl Harbor and Executive Order 9066
In the midst of World War II, Japan was severely unhappy with the 
United States’ presence in Asia.20  Despite attempts to work out their differ-
ences, the United States and Japan were unable to find a peaceful settlement.21 
On December 7, 1941, in the midst of World War II, Japan launched an attack 
on the United States Naval Base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.22  As a result, the 
16. Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova, & Jeffrey Hallock, Frequently Requested Statistics 
on Immigration in the United States, MigrationPolicy (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www. 
migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested- statistics-immigrants-and- immigration-
united-states.
17. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
18. The Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1971).
19. See, e.g., Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the 
Japanese-American Internment Cases, The U.S. Department of Justice Archives (May 
20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals- 
mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases.
20. Karen Alonso, Korematsu v. United States: Japanese-American Internment 
Camps 18 (1998).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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United States lost eight battleships and two hundred airplanes.23  Over 2,400 
American servicemen and civilians were killed or deemed missing, and 1,300 
people were wounded.24
The next day, President Franklin Roosevelt sought a Congressional 
declaration of war against Japan with the well-known speech: “Yesterday, 
December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States 
of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by  .  .  .  the Empire of 
Japan.”25  President Roosevelt pressed forward to convince the United States 
public that Japan had deliberately deceived the United States.26  Americans 
felt tricked because Japan did not make a formal declaration of war against 
the United States before the Pearl Harbor attack.27
Sensing the country’s fear, vulnerability, and readiness for war, Pres-
ident Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942.28  The 
order authorized the Secretary of War and other military commanders to 
“prescribe military areas . . . from which any or all persons may be excluded, 
and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave 
shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War . . . may impose 
in his discretion.”29  President Roosevelt justified this executive order because 
“successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against 
espionage and against sabotage.”30  Congress responded to Executive Order 
9066 by enacting Section 97a of Title 18 of the United States Code.31  In this 
legislation, Congress enforced the exclusions under the Executive Order and 
made it a misdemeanor for anyone to enter or remain in any restricted mili-
tary zone contrary to the order of a military commander.32
Despite General John L. DeWitt’s initial stance that opposed evacuating 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast, he experienced enormous public 
pressure to make bold moves in the name of national security.  Consequently, 
he issued Public Proclamation No. 1.33  The proclamation stated, “the entire 
Pacific Coast . . . is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requir-
ing the adoption of military measures necessary to establish the safeguards 
against such enemy operations.”34  On March 21, 1942, President Roosevelt 
23. Id.
24. Id. at 18–19.
25. Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Pearl Harbor Address to the Nation, American 
Rhetoric: Top 100 Speeches (Dec. 8, 1941) http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
fdrpearlharbor.htm.
26. Nathan P. Eberline, The Strength of a Story, 85 J. Kan. B. Ass’n 7 (2016).
27. Alonso, supra note 20, at 19.
28. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (1984).
29. Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese 
(1942), https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=74&page=transcript.
30. Id.
31. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
32. Id.
33. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 24; Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
34. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
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signed into effect Public Law 503, which made it a federal crime to disobey 
any of the public proclamations that General DeWitt issued.35
Six days later, General DeWitt ordered that all people who were of 
Japanese ancestry could not leave designated military areas without permis-
sion.36  General DeWitt determined that government-issued evacuation was 
mandatory for all Japanese Americans on the West Coast and established 
that internment camps were necessary for national security reasons.37  As a 
result of all the proclamations, people could not leave the zones in which 
they resided, but also could not remain in the zones unless they went to an 
“Assembly Center.”38  These “assembly centers” were internment camps.39
B. Korematsu’s Case and the Supreme Court
When the evacuations began, Fred Korematsu stayed at his home while 
his family went to an internment camp.40  He was later reported to author-
ities by a shop clerk in his neighborhood and sent to the same internment 
camp as his family.41  The government charged Fred Korematsu with break-
ing Public Law 503, which made it a crime for him to stay in the military 
area after the evacuation was issued.42  There was no inquiry as to whether 
Fred Korematsu was actually disloyal, treasonous, or involved with espionage. 
Fred Korematsu was a United States citizen who was born on American soil.43 
Nonetheless, Fred Korematsu was sentenced to a five-year probationary term 
and taken into custody in the courthouse.44
Prior to Korematsu, in Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit opinion holding: (1) the curfew order and 
other military orders were not necessarily beyond the war power of Congress 
and the Executive branch, (2) exclusion from a threatened area has a definite 
and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage, and (3) 
Congress approved military authority to declare who should remain in the 
threatened areas.45
In Fred Korematsu’s petition for certiorari, he challenged the Court’s 
conclusions in the Hirabayashi case.46  Korematsu contended that “all danger 
of Japanese invasion of the West Coast had disappeared” by the time General 
35. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 31; Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
36. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 32; Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
37. Alonso, supra note 20, at 32.
38. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
39. Konrad Linke, Assembly Centers, Densho Encyclopedia (Jul. 15, 2015), http://
encyclopedia.densho.org/Assembly_centers.
40. See Larson, supra note 1.
41. Id.
42. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409.
43. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 15 (“Prior to the 1950s, the only way a person of 
Japanese ancestry could become a citizen of the United States was to be born in the United 
States.”).
44. See id. at 46.
45. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
46. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
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Dewitt issued Order No. 34.47  In the government’s brief to the Supreme 
Court, General DeWitt submitted a report to justify his orders: There were 
incidents of signaling from shore to enemy ships at sea, the Japanese Ameri-
cans lived near military areas where they could be encouraged to have loyalty 
to Japan and cause the most damage on American soil, and the military could 
not separate the loyal from the disloyal American citizens quickly enough.48
The Supreme Court ruled against Fred Korematsu.  The Court relied 
on its judicial deference in Hirabayashi to military authority and upheld the 
exclusion order that was created through Executive Order 9066.49  Through 
Fred Korematsu’s case, the Supreme Court established that “under conditions 
of modern warfare . . . the power to protect must be commensurate with the 
threatened danger.”50  In addition, the Court determined that the orders that 
prohibited Fred Korematsu from leaving or staying in his residence were not 
in conflict because the military provided detention in assembly or relocation 
centers and the first order that prohibited Japanese Americans from leaving 
their homes was in effect “until and to the extent that a future proclama-
tion or order should so permit.”51  Ultimately, the Supreme Court noted that 
Fred Korematsu was not detained based on his ancestry.  The Supreme Court 
hinted that internment based on race would have been treated differently:
Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the 
imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial 
prejudice  .  .  .    To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, with-
out reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely 
confuses the issue.  Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area 
because of hostility to him or his race.  He was excluded because we are at 
war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military 
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to 
take proper security measures . . . because Congress . . . determined that 
they should have the power to do just this.52
However, the Court refused to recognize that the internment camps 
were built for and used only by one ethnic group: Japanese Americans.
C. Post–World War II Remedies
On February 19, 1976, President Gerald Ford issued Proclamation 4417, 
which formally terminated the authority of Executive Order No. 9066.53  In 
his proclamation, President Gerald Ford stated “we have learned from the 
tragedy of that long-ago experience forever to treasure liberty and jus-
tice for each individual American, and resolve that this kind of action shall 
47. Id.
48. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 56.
49. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20.
50. Id. at 220.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 223.
53. Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 20, 1976).
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never again be repeated.”54  Consequently, Congress established the Com-
mission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1980.55  The 
Commission’s purpose was to review the facts and circumstances regarding 
Executive Order 9066, its impact on American citizens and permanent resi-
dent aliens, and the directives of the military forces.56  After its investigation, 
the Commission would recommend appropriate remedies in a written report 
to Congress.57
Forty years after the Japanese American internment camps were built, 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians dis-
credited General DeWitt’s report.58  The Commission also discovered that 
military necessity did not warrant the exclusion and detention of all Amer-
icans with Japanese ancestry.59  With new evidence that several agencies of 
the government either withheld facts or reported wrongfully, Fred Korematsu 
was eligible for a petition of coram nobis.60  To win relief, the petitioner must 
prove that the court would have prevented the conviction “had the correct 
facts been known to the court at the time of the trial.”61
On January 19, 1983, Fred Korematsu filed a motion in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco.62  In the 
relitigation of the case, Fred Korematsu’s legal team presented new evidence 
of government misconduct, showing that the government’s legal team had 
intentionally suppressed information from government intelligence agen-
cies that reported that Japanese Americans posed no military threat to the 
United States.63  Judge Marilyn Patel determined that Fred Korematsu’s case 
met all the requirements for coram nobis relief and set aside his conviction. 
Though Judge Patel had no jurisdictional authority to overrule the Supreme 
Court decision, she emphasized the government’s agreement with the Com-
mission’s report that “Korematsu lies overruled in the court of history.”64
54. Id.
55. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1416 (1984).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id. (“there was substantial credible evidence from a number of federal civil-
ian and military agencies contradicting the report of General DeWitt that military neces-
sity justified exclusion and internment of all persons of Japanese ancestry without regard 
to individual identification of those who may have been potentially disloyal.”).
59. Id.
60. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 85.  A writ of coram nobis is a procedure that grants 
relief to the petitioner that has been criminally convicted and no other remedy exists for 
the convicted.  See William G. Wheatley, Coram Nobis Practice in Criminal Cases, 18 Am. 
Jur. Trials 1 § 2 (1971 & Supp. 2018).
61. William G. Wheatley, Coram Nobis Practice in Criminal Cases, 18 Am. Jur. Trials 
1 § 2 (1971 & Supp. 2018).
62. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1411 (1984) (“a writ of coram nobis is an appro-
priate remedy by which the court can correct errors in criminal convictions where other 
remedies are not available.”).
63. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 90.
64. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
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In 1998, President Bill Clinton awarded Fred Korematsu the Presidential 
Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor, for his “extraordi-
nary stand” for civil rights.65  In 2011, Solicitor General Neal Katyal issued 
a confession of error recognizing the mistakes of the former Solicitor Gen-
eral, Charles Fahy, in the case of Japanese American internment.66  Katyal 
revealed that the Office of the Solicitor General had received a key intelli-
gence report that undermined the rationale supporting internment.  However, 
Solicitor General Fahy did not inform the Supreme Court of this new infor-
mation.  Katyal noted that in retrospect, “the court thought it unlikely that 
the Supreme Court would have ruled the same way had the Solicitor General 
exhibited complete candor.”67
II. The Travel Ban and its Parallels to Korematsu
Despite Judge Patel’s statement that Korematsu is no longer a strong 
precedent, the spirit of Korematsu lives on in Trump v. Hawaii.
A. The History of the Ban
Trump’s travel ban went through three iterations before it entered the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.68  The first travel ban, Executive Order 13769, 
was issued days after Trump was inaugurated.69  In this first ban, travel was 
suspended from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen for ninety 
days, refugees were blocked for 120 days, and travel from Syria was indef-
initely suspended.70  There was chaos in airports across the United States 
with thousands of protesters rallying against the ban.71  Within twenty-four 
hours, a New York federal judge, Judge Ann Donnelly, stayed the travel ban 
on the basis that the irreparable harm suffered by immigrants outweighed 
the administrative burdens and national security concerns of the government, 
since the immigrants were already vetted and approved to enter the country.72 
65. Honoring a Japanese-American Who Fought Against Internment Camps, NPR 
(Jan. 30, 2014) https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/01/30/268917800/ honoring-a-
japanese-american-who-fought-against-internment-camps.
66. Office of Public Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The Solicitor 
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (2017), https://
www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals- mistakes-during-
japanese-american-internment-cases.
67. Id.
68. Amber Phillips, A Brief Rundown of the Long Legal History of Trump’s 
Travel Ban, Wash. Post (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2018/06/26/a-brief-rundown-of-the-long-legal-history-of-trumps-travel-ban/?utm_ 
term=.07463c989468.
69. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
70. See Phillips, supra note 68.
71. James Doubek, PHOTOS: Thousands Protest At Airports Nationwide Against 
Trump’s Immigration Order, NPR (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ thetwo-
way/2017/01/29/512250469/photos-thousands-protest-at-airports- nationwide-against-
trumps-immigration-order (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
72. See Phillips, supra note 68.  See also Seung Min Kim et al., Judge Blocks 
Deportations as Trump Order Sparks Global Outrage, Politico (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.
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Other judges refused to reinstate the ban and ruled that the government 
incorrectly claimed that “national security concerns are unreviewable, even if 
those actions potentially contravene constitutional rights and protections.”73
A couple months later, the Trump Administration tried again.  On 
March 6, 2017, Trump voluntarily withdrew the previous executive order and 
signed Executive Order 13780 into effect.74  This order took Iraq off the orig-
inal list of countries on the Travel Ban and eliminated the permanent ban 
on Syrian refugees.75  However, Executive Order 13780 continued the 120-
day suspension of all refugee admissions into the United States.76  Nine days 
later, federal judges from Hawaii and Maryland issued nationwide temporary 
restraining orders against the travel ban.  The Hawaii federal judge relied 
on President Trump’s public statements and decided “a reasonable, objective 
observer . . . would conclude that the Executive Order was issued with a pur-
pose to disfavor a particular religion[.]”77 When the Trump Administration 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit blocked 
the travel restrictions but allowed the 120-day refugee ban.78  The Fourth Cir-
cuit noted that the second travel ban “drips with religious intolerance, animus, 
and discrimination” based on President Trump’s public statements about 
implementing a Muslim Ban.79  The Trump Administration then appealed to 
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court complicated the travel ban.  They allowed the 
ninety-day ban to be implemented, but the Court provided an exception for 
individuals who could prove a “bona fide” relationship to a person or entity 
in the United States.80  On September 24, the second travel ban expired and 
the Supreme Court dismissed the case because there was no longer a live case 
or controversy.81
With two failed executive orders, the Trump Administration issued a 
third travel ban.  This time, the travel ban took the form of a proclamation 
instead of an executive order, Proclamation 9645 known as the “Presidential 
politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-refugees-lawsuit-iraq-visas-234305.
73. Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel Ban, Dealing Trump Another 
Legal Loss, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/
appeals-court-trump-travel-ban.html.
74. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
75. Conor Finnegan, A Timeline of Trump’s Battle with the Courts to Keep His Travel 
Ban Alive, ABC News (Oct. 19, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-trumps-
battle-courts-travel-ban- alive/story?id=50559798.
76. Id.
77. Richard Gonzales et al., Trump Travel Ban Blocked Nationwide By Federal 
Judges in Hawaii, Maryland, NPR (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ thetwo-
way/2017/03/15/520171478/trump-travel-ban-faces-court-hearings-by-challengers-today.
78. See Finnegan, supra note 75.
79. Id.
80. Id.  The Supreme Court eventually ruled that a bona fide person included grand-
parents, grandchildren, aunts and uncles, cousins, parents, spouses, fiancées, children, and 
in-laws.
81. Id.
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Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety 
Threats.”82  This third attempt broadened the travel ban to include Chad, Iran, 
Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Venezuela.83  Months later, 
the Supreme Court upheld Proclamation 9645 and claimed that the Presi-
dent lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under § 1182(f) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act to suspend the entry of aliens into the 
United States.84
The effects of Proclamation 9645, the September 24, 2017 travel ban, 
have yet to be fully determined, but they are vast and incalculable.  As a 
result of the travel ban, the United States has admitted the lowest number 
of refugees in decades.85  In 1980, the number of admitted refugees exceeded 
200,000.86  In the first nine months of the 2018 fiscal year, the number of 
admitted refugees was only 15,788.87  The separation of families as well as the 
burden on immigrant students who feel trapped in the United States could 
be deleterious and damaging to the American psyche and the overall health 
of its people.88
B. The Parallels Between Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii
There are countless similarities between Korematsu and Trump v. 
Hawaii.  Perhaps the most notable similarity is that both cases took place 
in the midst of war.  Korematsu was heard during World War II and Trump 
v. Hawaii occurred during America’s long-fought War on Terror.  During 
wartime, the country tends to feel vulnerable, so its citizens may be more will-
ing to support unnecessary military action and forgive their “ingroup” also 
known as the American government, for committing atrocious harms against 
those not considered a part of the “ingroup.”89  For example, General DeWitt 
claimed that there was a “military necessity” to evacuate Japanese Ameri-
cans.90  President Trump said, “We [Americans] need to be smart, vigilant, 
82. Proclamation No. 9645 (2017).
83. See id.  See also Dept. of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: The President’s 
Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety 
Threats, Dept. of Human Serv. (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/fact-sheet- 
president-s-proclamation- enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes.
84. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018).
85. Alicia Parlapiano, The Travel Ban Has Been Upheld.  Here Are Some of Its Effects 
So Far, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/us/ 
politics/trump-travel-ban-effects.html.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Lanise Shortell, Trump’s Travel Ban is Keeping Dying Children From Their 
Families, Huffington Post (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ opinion-
travel-ban-hospice-pediatric_us_5bc60583e4b055bc947a9b08.
89. See Michael J. A. Wohl and Nyla R. Branscombe, Group Threat, Collective Angst, 
and Ingroup Forgiveness for the War in Iraq, 30 Political Psychology 193–217 (Apr. 2009).
90. See A Brief History of Japanese American Relocation During World War II, 
Nat’l. Park Serv., https://www.nps.gov/articles/historyinternment.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 
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and tough.  We need the courts to give us back our rights.  We need the Travel 
Ban as an extra level of safety.”  In another tweet, President Trump tweeted, 
“When a country is no longer able to say who can, and who cannot, come in 
& out, especially for reasons of safety & security—big trouble!”91  Both gov-
ernments fed off the public’s obsession over safety.
Feeding off of the public’s obsession over safety, the government in both 
cases used fear tactics, harmful rhetoric, and racebaiting hysteria in order 
to energize their political bases to promote the racist exclusionary orders. 
During World War II, fearful rhetoric such as “Once a Jap, always a Jap,” and 
“You cannot . . . make him the same as a white man any more than you can 
reverse the laws of nature” trickled into the American vernacular.92  More-
over, newspapers reported that Japanese Americans were “treacherous and 
barbarous by nature.”93  Thus, heightened anti-Japanese sentiments emerged 
throughout the country, drowning any wishes to remain isolated from World 
War II.  The country’s sole focus was on war.  Calls for Japanese removal were 
popular, even Earl Warren—then-attorney general of California—wrote that 
“the Japanese situation” would jeopardize the entire defense effort.94
Similar to Earl Warren’s written statement, President Trump’s campaign 
speeches and presidential tweets demonstrated his true beliefs and views of 
Muslims and Muslim Americans.  For example, while campaigning in South 
Carolina, Trump read a statement, “calling for a total and complete shutdown 
of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can 
figure out what is going on.”95  While serving as president, Trump tweeted 
“People, the lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am 
calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!”96
The hateful rhetoric utilized in both cases was successfully disguised 
in the majority opinions of both Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii.  In both 
cases, the Court failed to address the racial animus that guided the execu-
tive branch, hiding behind the rationale of national security to defend the 
orders.  For example, the Korematsu majority opinion does not include Gen-
eral DeWitt’s testimony before a House subcommittee in April 1943 where 
he stated, “[W]e must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped 
off the map.”97  Similarly, in Trump v. Hawaii, the court held that a reasonable 
observer would not conclude that the primary purpose of the Proclamation 
2019).
91. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump). Twitter (Feb. 4, 2017, 8:59 am), https:// 
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/827864176043376640?lang=en.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Amrit Cheng, Trump’s Lawyers Say the Muslim Ban Has No Bias, But His Tweets 
Show Otherwise, ACLU (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/
trumps-lawyers-say-muslim-ban-has-no-bias-his-tweets-show-otherwise.
96. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump). Twitter (Jun 5, 2017, 6:20 pm), https:// 
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/871674214356484096?lang=en.
97. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 387 (2011).
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is to disfavor Islam and its adherents by excluding them from the country—
despite the laundry list of pointed and racist tweets that the White House 
considers “official statements.”
Not only did the Court uphold the orders under the guise of national 
security, but the Courts in Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii relied on false 
information and flawed data.  In Korematsu, General DeWitt’s report to the 
Supreme Court referring to incidents of Japanese Americans committing 
espionage by signaling enemy ships from shore was ultimately proven false.98 
The curfew that General DeWitt established was based on assumptions that 
the Japanese were attempting to contact Japanese Americans rather than the 
actual reality that the curfew had no effect on the safety of others and was not 
considered a military necessity.99
Similarly, to justify Proclamation 9645 the Trump Administration 
argued that the countries serve as havens for terrorist and the system of vet-
ting immigrants is “faulty.”100  However, Justice Sotomayor countered that 
the only part that is “faulty” is the government’s argument.  In her dissenting 
opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, Sotomayor details the process of gaining admis-
sion into the United States as a foreigner.101  To simply obtain a visa, a person 
must produce documents that prove her identity, background, and criminal 
history.102  Then, a consular with the State Department interviews the indi-
vidual to determine whether the person is a threat to the United States.103 
Any person who has been engaged or associated with terrorist activity is 
ineligible to receive a visa.104  These intensive vetting procedures fulfill the 
“putative national-security interests” that Trump relied on to justify Procla-
mation 9645.105
Both cases are categorical exclusionary orders on the basis of race and 
religion.  In Korematsu, the United States government was unable to con-
jure up real and substantive evidence that all Japanese Americans posed a 
national security threat during World War II.  There were no verified stories 
of espionage or treason against Japanese Americans on American soil.  How-
ever, there were proven stories of German spies such as the Duquesne Spy 
Ring that collected information on American shipping patterns and military 
intelligence.106  Furthermore, there was “Operation Pastorius,” which was a 
group of eight Nazi saboteurs who were assigned to create acts of terrorism 
on American soil in an effort to create chaos.107  Based on its faulty ratio-
98. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 67.
99. Greene, supra note 97, at 423.
100. Id.
101. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2433–48 (2018).
102. Id. at 2443–4 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion).
103. Id. at 2444.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Evan Andrews, 5 Attacks on U.S. Soil During World War II, History Channel 
(Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.history.com/news/5-attacks-on-u-s-soil-during-world-war-ii.
107. Id.
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nale for Japanese American internment camps, the United States targeted 
the wrong group.  This misplaced targeting further proves that ordering Jap-
anese American internment camps was based on racial animus rather than 
actual military intelligence.
Comparably, in Trump v. Hawaii, the United States is unable to explain 
how the travel ban actually prevents terrorism.  In fact, there have been more 
acts of terrorism by white American males than Muslims on American soil.108 
Between the years 2008 to 2016, “there were almost twice as many terror-
ist incidents by right-wing extremists as by Islamist extremists in the United 
States.”109  If the United States wants to prevent domestic terrorism, it is tar-
geting the wrong group.  Additionally, as discussed earlier, the United States 
already has strict vetting procedures for those seeking asylum or refugee assis-
tance.  Therefore, as Justice Sotomayor points out, the “[g]overnment remains 
wholly unable to articulate any credible national-security interest that would 
go unaddressed by the current statutory scheme absent the Proclamation.”110
Moreover, those seeking asylum, primarily from Central and South 
America have faced conditions similar to internment camps.  Children have 
been violently separated from their parents and thrown into cages without 
any future plans from President Trump to reunite them.111  The rhetoric sur-
rounding these refugees are eerily similar to the propaganda used against 
Japanese Americans during World War II.  President Trump tweeted “We 
cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country.  When somebody 
comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them 
back from where they came.  Our system is a mockery to good immigration 
policy and Law and Order.”112  Trump’s lack of respect for an individual’s 
access to justice, regardless of citizenship, along with the racist undertones 
of stating “our Country” draw intense parallels to the treatment of Japanese 
Americans.  Therefore, it is imperative to remember the wrongful acts of the 
presidents’ executive orders, the Court’s actions, and the misinformed propa-
ganda to prevent the continuance of malicious detention of individuals.
In a 60 Minutes interview, a spokesperson for pro–Trump Great Ameri-
can PAC, argued that an immigrant registry for specifically Muslim countries 
would be constitutional based on Japanese American internment.113  With the 
108. Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, Most of America’s Terrorists Are White, and Not Muslim, 
Huffington Post (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/domestic- 
terrorism-white-supremacists-islamist-extremists_us_594c46e4e4b0da2c731a84df.
109. Id.
110. Trump, supra note 101, at 2444 (quoting J. Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion).
111. See Niraj Warikoo, Michigan Congresswoman: I Saw Immigrant Kids Held 
in a Cage, Crying Moms, Detroit Free Press (June 23, 2018), https://www.freep.com/
story/news/nation/2018/06/23/migrant-children-detention-centers-mcallen-texas-brenda- 
lawrence/724553002.
112. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jun. 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1010900865602019329.
113. Margaret Hartmann, Trump Supporter Cites Japanese Internment Camps as 
‘Precedent’ for Muslim Registry, N.Y. Mag.: Intelligencer (Nov. 17, 2016), http://nymag.
com/intelligencer/2016/11/trump-supporter-muslim-registry-internment-camps.html.
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revitalization of national security in Trump v. Hawaii as a sufficient means to 
discriminate on a racial, ethnic, and religious basis, a Muslim registry could 
theoretically be possible.
Several lawsuits were filed against the travel bans such as International 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump.114  During oral arguments at the Ninth 
Circuit, Judge Richard Paez inquired about Korematsu and the government 
adamantly stated “This case is not Korematsu, and if it were I would not be 
standing here, and the United States would not be defending it.”115  Those 
words have yet to quell the fears that a Muslim registry could still be imple-
mented in the near future.116
III. How The Court got Korematsu and trump v. Hawaii Wrong
A. The Dissenting Opinions
Korematsu was decided by a 6–3 vote.117  With three dissents, one concur-
ring opinion, and five justices joining the majority, the difference in opinions 
exposes the severe contradictions in the majority’s reasoning to uphold the 
exclusionary acts.
Justice Roberts’ dissent stressed that the internment camps were indeed 
based on ancestry and that Fred Korematsu was detained “without evidence 
or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United 
States.”118  Moreover, Roberts was highly concerned about Fred Korematsu’s 
impossible choice due to the fact that Military Orders prohibited him from 
remaining in the zone in which he resided and also prevented him from leav-
ing the zone, thus forcing him to go to an Assembly Center.  Roberts called 
this “a cleverly devised trap to accomplish the real purpose of the military 
authority, which was to lock him up in a concentration camp.”119
114. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.
com/case-files/cases/trump-v-international-refugee-assistance-project (last visited Oct. 22, 
2017).
115. See Sorkin, supra note 12.
116. See Noah Feldman, Why Korematsu is Not a Precedent, The N.Y. Times (Nov. 
18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/why-korematsu-is-not-a-precedent.
html.  There are several prominent people who have cited the Japanese American intern-
ment camps as a means of “protecting America first.”  Kat Chow, Renewed Support for 
Muslim Registry Called “Abhorrent”, NPR (Nov. 17, 2016) https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2016/11/17/502442853/renewed-support-for-muslim-registry-called-abhorrent. 
For example, a popular conservative writer and known “Trump surrogate”, Carl Higbie, 
stated in an interview with Megyn in support of Korematsu that “the president needs to 
protect America first, and if that means having people that are not protected under our 
Constitution have some sort of registry so we can understand, until we can identify the true 
threat and where it’s coming from, I support it.”  Id.
117. Korematsu, supra note 3, at 214.
118. Id. at 226.
119. Id. at 232.
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Justice Murphy dissented on the grounds that the exclusion “falls into 
the ugly abyss of racism.”120  Murphy asserted that judicial deference must be 
used towards the military, but there must be definite limits to military discre-
tion.121  In his opinion, Murphy believed that there was a test that the Court 
should have used to determine whether the government could properly take 
away a person’s constitutional rights.122  The Court should have inquired 
whether an action is reasonably related to public danger.123  The Government 
never had to prove their claim that there was no time to interview individ-
ual Japanese Americans and that it was necessary to deprive them all of their 
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.124
Perhaps the most notable of the dissents was the final one: Justice Jack-
son’s.  In his dissenting opinion, he reiterated that Fred Korematsu was a 
United States citizen and that his conviction rested solely on his presence 
in the state he resided.125  Jackson created a hypothetical in which he com-
pared Fred Korematsu to a German alien enemy, an Italian alien enemy, and 
a citizen of American-born ancestors.126  If all the people he listed violated 
the exclusion order, only Fred Korematsu would be convicted “not from any-
thing he did, said, or thought, different than they, but only in that he was born 
of a different racial stock.”127  The Court did not rely on evidence, but rather 
assumptions premised on racialized fears from World War II.
Jackson conceded that military orders do not all have to abide by the 
Constitution, but those orders are temporary and only last as long as the 
war.128  However, he warned that the Court’s interpretation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause was a “far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation 
of the order itself.”129  Jackson referred to the Court’s decision as a “loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need.”130  He feared that war powers could be unchecked 
and fall into “irresponsible and unscrupulous hands” because “the courts 
wield no power equal to its restraint.”
120. Id. at 233.
121. Id. at 234.
122. Id.  at 234 (“Thus, like other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional 
rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of hav-
ing its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled.”).
123. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 79.
124. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any state any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”); see also Korematsu, supra note 3, at 241 (“No 
adequate reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese Americans on an individual 
basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was 
done in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry.”).
125. Korematsu, supra note 3, at 243.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 244.
129. Id. at 245.
130. Id. at 246.
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Justice Sotomayor’s sharp dissent dismantles the majority’s opinion 
that the Proclamation is facially neutral and advances the interest of national 
security.  She points to President Trump’s many tweets that call for a Muslim 
Ban.131  Trump told the media that under his first executive order, “Christians 
would be given priority for entry as refugees into the United States.”132  Trump 
was the one who invoked religion when it came to the executive orders and 
proclamation.  Relying on “openly available data,” such as Trump’s public 
statements and tweets, Sotomayor concludes that a “reasonable observer 
would conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus” 
and that the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the Establishment Clause should have 
succeeded.133  Though the plaintiffs argue the Establishment Clause, whereas 
Korematsu argued for the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, both plaintiffs 
relied on the fact that national security should not override their constitu-
tional rights.  Justice Sotomayor agreed and harkens back to Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
stating that national security cannot be invoked as a “talisman” that can be 
used to “ward off inconvenient claims.”134  Finally, Sotomayor concludes by 
drawing a parallel between Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii.  She refers to 
both cases as being “rooted in dangerous stereotypes about  .  .  .  a particu-
lar group’s supposed inability to assimilate and desire to harm the United 
States.”135  Because of this, the “Court redeploys the same dangerous logic 
underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one ‘gravely wrong’ decision 
with another.”136
B. The Nonapplication of Strict Scrutiny in Korematsu
At the beginning of the Korematsu majority opinion, Justice Black 
immediately stated that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect . . . courts must subject them to 
the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the 
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”137  However, by 
the end of his opinion, he arrives at a conflicting conclusion that the intern-
ment camps were not created on the basis of race, but rather because the 
United States was at war with Japan.  Because of this argument, Justice Black 
was able to sidestep the application of strict scrutiny for the military action.
Nowhere in the opinion does Justice Black explicitly state that strict 
scrutiny cannot be applied when national security is at risk.  Justice Black 
approved the exclusion order as a military power without acknowledging 
that strict scrutiny must apply to all aspects of governmental action when 
dealing with suspect classes.  Had Justice Black appropriately considered his 
opening statement, he would have recognized that Fred Korematsu would 
131. Trump, supra note 101, at 2437–8 (quoting J. Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion).
132. Id. at 2436.
133. Id. at 2438.
134. Id. at 2446.
135. Id. at 2447.
136. Id. at 2448.
137. Korematsu, supra note 3, at 216.
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not have been imprisoned “but for” his Japanese appearance, ethnicity, and 
last name.  For strict scrutiny to apply in Fred Korematsu’s case, the Court 
would have had to examine whether his incarceration was a form of “racial 
antagonism” that Justice Black asserted would never justify restrictions on 
civil rights or if it was a form of “public necessity” that allowed certain restric-
tions.  Because the Court only focused on the military exclusion order, the 
interpretation of the relationship between strict scrutiny and military orders 
remains ambiguous.
Korematsu is considered anticanon because the Court approved bad 
racial profiling.  The anticanon consists of “the set of cases whose central 
propositions all legitimate decisions must refute.”138  While testifying before 
a House subcommittee in April 1943, General DeWitt explained “we must 
worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”139  Gen-
eral DeWitt believed that a person of Japanese ancestry would always be 
loyal to Japan over the United States even if the person had always lived in 
the United States and was a citizen.140  Justice Murphy exposed the Court’s 
use of faulty evidence when he pointed to the fact that there was not a single 
convicted case of a person with Japanese heritage conducting espionage or 
sabotage against the United States.141  If the Court was truly concerned with 
the loyalty of all persons with Japanese heritage, they should have looked to 
their actions (or their inactions).
Furthermore, the timing of the case could have made the case ineffec-
tive.  Ruling in Fred Korematsu’s favor would not have harmed the United 
States’ war efforts since an Allied victory was guaranteed in the Pacific at the 
time.142  Because Fred Korematsu’s case dealt with a criminal conviction, the 
Court could have focused on his treatment as a citizen and vacated his con-
viction for lack of due process.143
The Korematsu Court did not have to abide by the Hirabayashi prec-
edent.  The Supreme Court has often rejected precedent because the case 
serves “simply as a moment in historical time in which particular justices 
applied the law to specific facts.”144  Subsequent Supreme Court opinions 
could also ignore any surviving Korematsu precedent if they determine that 
one exists.  In the landmark gay rights case, Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Ken-
nedy concluded: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
138. Greene, supra note 97, at 379.  Other cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessy v. 
Ferguson, and Lochner v. New York fall into the anticanon as well.  Id.
139. Id. at 423.
140. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 68.
141. Korematsu, supra note 3, at 241 (“Nor is there any denial of the fact that not one 
person of Japanese ancestry was accused or convicted of espionage or sabotage after Pearl 
Harbor while they were still free, a fact which is some evidence of the loyalty of the vast 
majority of these individuals and of the effectiveness of the established methods of com-
batting these evils.”).
142. See Alonso, supra note 20, at 68.
143. Id.
144. Feldman, supra note 116.
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correct today.”145  The majority opinion of Lawrence tackles the idea of stare 
decisis as being all-too determinative.  While the doctrine of stare decisis must 
be recognized and respected, the Court emphasized that it is not “an inexo-
rable command.”146
One of the most widely recognized cases, Brown v. Board, explicitly 
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson by striking down the “separate but equal” 
doctrine that perpetuated legal segregation.147  The Court disregarded stare 
decisis and instead relied on consequential reasoning.148  The Court used psy-
chological studies, historical data, and institutional knowledge to determine 
that segregation harms a student’s educational opportunities to such a degree 
that it infringed on his equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.149  Plessy v. Ferguson is rooted in the anticanon and can 
no longer be cited as valid law.
Furthermore, Congress can move a landmark case into the anticanon 
through legislation.  For example, with the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Dred Scott v. Sandford case lost its power of precedent. 
In Dred Scott, the Court concluded that black people were not considered 
United States citizens.150  After the Civil War, Congress passed the Four-
teenth Amendment which granted citizenship to every person who was born 
in the United States regardless of race, color, or ethnicity.151  Upon the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress nullified the Dred Scott ruling 
permanently.152
However, with respect to Korematsu, a formal repudiation by the 
Supreme Court or Congress may never occur in the future because the case 
facts are so specific to war time, exclusionary acts, executive orders, and deten-
tion on American soil: “the more obviously wrong a decision, the fewer the 
reasonable opportunities for citation.  The most obvious constitutional errors 
are the least likely to be replicated.”153
IV. Subsequent Cases that Eroded Korematsu 
and trump v. Hawaii
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld’s Destruction of Korematsu
Pearl Harbor and the September 11 attacks elicited similar responses 
from the American public.154  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans 
145. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
146. Id. at 577.
147. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Any language in 
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”).
148. Norman Redlich et al., Understanding Constitutional Law 18 (3d ed. 2005).
149. Id. at 492–95.
150. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 396 (1857).
151. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. Greene, supra note 97, at 406.
153. Greene, supra note 97, at 462.
154. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in 
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feared the Japanese; after the attacks on the Twin Towers, Americans were 
afraid of Muslims and Muslim Americans.  Within one week of the 9/11 
attacks, Congress issued the Authorization for Use of Military Force (here-
inafter “AUMF”), which allowed the President to “use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations  .  .  . he determines planned, autho-
rized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks  .  .  .  in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”155  This lan-
guage echoed similar sentiments to President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive 
Order 9066, which gave the Secretary of War deferential powers as a response 
to an attack on the United States soil.156  Moreover, two weeks after 9/11, 
“over 500 individuals were arrested or detained, and thousands of resident 
aliens were asked to submit to ‘random questioning,’ almost all whom were 
Arabic or Middle Eastern.”157
Two years after the AUMF’s enactment, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld appeared 
in front of the Supreme Court with the question of whether an individual 
could contest his or her status as an enemy combatant.158  Yaser Hamdi was 
born in the United States and captured in Afghanistan by a military group 
that opposed the Taliban government.159  He was then turned over to the 
United States government.  During his detention in Charleston, South Caro-
lina, the Government asserted that Hamdi was an “enemy combatant” which 
allowed them to hold Hamdi in the United States indefinitely without formal 
charges.160  Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and 
argued that Hamdi’s detention was not legally authorized under the Non-De-
tention Act.161
The Supreme Court concluded that Congress had authorized detention 
through the AUMF.162  However, the AUMF does not grant indefinite deten-
tion for the purpose of interrogation.163  A citizen-detainee may challenge his 
classification as an enemy combatant and must receive notice of the factual 
basis for the classification and an opportunity to rebut the assertions before 
Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273, 296 (2003) (“The administration’s present position seems 
indistinguishable from the position taken by the Roosevelt administration and endorsed by 
the Supreme Court in Korematsu”).
155. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
156. Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese 
(1942).
157. Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post–September 11th Analysis of 
Race and National Security, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 451, 452–53 (2002).
158. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
159. Id. at 510.
160. Id. An enemy combatant is a person who supports “forces hostile to the United 
States” or “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.”  Id. at 516.
161. Id. at 511.
162. Id. at 517.
163. Id. at 521.
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a neutral decision maker.164  The citizen-detainee also has the right to access 
to counsel.165
Justice David Souter and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in 
the plurality opinion.166  They delineated the history of the Non-Detention 
Act and its purpose with respect to Korematsu.  The Justices argued that the 
Non-Detention Act requires clear congressional authorization before any cit-
izen can be imprisoned and that the AUMF is not enough to trigger action.167
Several constitutional law experts have also drawn parallels between 
Korematsu and Hamdi: “like Korematsu, the Hamdi decision is deeply 
entrenched in political value judgments and assumptions, but comes clothed 
in the rhetoric of military necessity and cloaked in the legitimacy and ‘objec-
tivity’ of law.”168  Similar to how Fred Korematsu’s case at the lower court 
justified the government’s abuse of constitutional powers, the Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the government’s action to label Hamdi an enemy combatant 
without habeas corpus.169  By declaring Hamdi an enemy combatant, he was 
no longer entitled to constitutional rights afforded to American citizens.170 
Almost sixty years before Hamdi, Fred Korematsu was not permitted to con-
test the laws that forced him into detention.
Neither case has solid statistical data to support the racial profiling 
perpetuated by the government.  During World War II, the Japanese Amer-
icans were swept into internment camps out of the false fear that they were 
cooperating with the Japanese government.  After 9/11, the government 
has legitimized the racial targeting of Arabs and Muslims through the fol-
lowing means:
(1) the sweep of 1200 noncitizens—primarily from Arab or Muslim coun-
tries—for “investigation” to prevent terrorist attacks, although no one 
detained has been identified as engaged in terrorist activity; (2) five thou-
sand investigatory interviews of male non-citizens from Middle Eastern 
or Islamic countries on non-immigrant visas; (3) the selective enforce-
ment for those non-citizens from countries with “Al Qaeda terrorist 
presence”; (4) airline racial profiling of passengers; (5) anti-Arab violence 
and hate crimes . . . [that are] misdirected sense of patriotism.171
164. Id. at 533.
165. Id. at 539.
166. Id. at 540.
167. Id. at 543.
168. Chris K. Iijima, Shooting Justice Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: 
Judicial Abdication at the Convergence of Korematsu and McCarthy, 54 Syracuse L. Rev. 
109, 115 (2004).
169. Braber, supra note 157, at 467.
170. Iijima, supra note 168, at 130 (“The designation of Hamdi as an enemy com-
batant was not merely a technical classification, but one which stripped Hamdi of practi-
cally every constitutional right afforded an American citizen deprived of his or her liberty 
interest, including ones such as the right to counsel, knowledge or the specific charges, and 
access to a judicial tribunal.”).
171. Id.
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 Finally, the Hamdi case offers a solution to the Korematsu’s decision.  
The Hamdi court, though only a plurality, overtly stated that a citizen has 
the right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government 
without due process of law.172  In effect, this nullifies the government’s 
ability to recreate internment camps based on race and without habeas 
corpus.  Citizens on American soil have the guaranteed right to habeas 
corpus in order to contest the assumption that they are enemy combatants.
B. Hedges v. Obama
The President does not have the power to detain American citizens 
without habeas corpus.  Prior to the Hedges v. Obama decision in 2013, 
reporters and activists feared that their work covering the Taliban could 
be construed as supporting the Taliban or al-Qaeda.  If their work was con-
strued as support for these groups, reporters and activists would be detained 
despite their status as an American citizen.173  On December 31, 2011, Presi-
dent Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 (hereinafter called “NDAA”).174  Section 1021 of the NDAA reaffirmed 
the powers granted to the Executive branch through the AUMF to detain 
any individual who was “part of, or has substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or associated forces.”175  Quickly after the enactment of Section 1021 
of the NDAA, a group of writers, reporters, and activists argued that Section 
1021 did not merely reaffirm the AUMF, but rather expanded the President’s 
powers to detain American citizens on American soil.
The Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs did not have Article 
III standing because Section 1021 did not explicitly state the government’s 
authority to detain citizens.176  The Hedges court looked at the plain mean-
ing of Section 1021 and held that it did not mention the President’s authority 
to detain American citizens.  Though the Second Circuit could have cited 
Korematsu as anticanon for detaining American citizens on American soil, 
the court did not mention it at all.  Perhaps, the court acknowledged that 
even the facts of wartime did not align with the plaintiff’s allegations against 
Section 1021 because their case lacked the racial profiling that was central in 
Korematsu.  There are no laws that indicate the President has the power to 
detain American citizens without habeas corpus.
C. Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Need for Legislation
While Hamdi dealt with habeas corpus to contest enemy combatant 
status, the recently decided case, Ziglar v. Abbasi177 questioned whether indi-
viduals who were detained post–9/11 as terrorism suspects were allowed to 
172. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
173. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013).
174. Id. at 173.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 204.
177. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 615 (2017).
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sue high-ranking government officials for violating their constitutional rights 
through a Bivens action, ultimately receiving money damages.178
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the respondents were six men of Arab or South 
Asian descent who were present in the United States without documenta-
tion, arrested, and then detained in the Administrative Maximum Special 
Housing Unit.179  These individuals were subject to extreme conditions such 
as beatings, humiliating searches, solitary confinement and other abuses for 
several months.180
Respondents asserted that the Government had no reason to suspect 
them of any connection to terrorism and illegitimately detained them, subject-
ing them to harsh conditions.181  The Supreme Court denies the respondents’ 
arguments, holding that the individuals could not seek money damages from 
the officials through the Bivens action.182
In his dissent, Justice Breyer points out that there is a particular need 
for Bivens monetary damages under a Bivens action when security-related 
Government actions are at issue.183  Justice Breyer discusses how the Exec-
utive and Legislative Branch have historically taken action during different 
wars that “unnecessarily and unreasonably” infringed on American consti-
tutional rights.184  For example, Breyer explains how “thousands of civilians 
[were] imprisoned during the Civil War” because of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts.185  Korematsu is cited as another example of an action that officials knew 
at the time was unnecessary.186  Justice Breyer emphasizes that the courts do 
have a powerful role to play in protecting individual’s fundamental constitu-
tional rights even while national security is at stake.187  His dissent sheds light 
on the Court’s ability to intervene during times of national crises to protect 
fundamental constitutional rights.
If an individual is not allowed to sue high-ranking government offi-
cials for money damages under a Bivens claim, the Supreme Court could 
be hinting at a more deferential approach to the Executive and Legislative 
branches to enact proper legislation to expand recovery under a Bivens claim. 
178. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that a 
person whose constitutional rights had been violated by a federal agent could sue the fed-
eral agent despite the lack of a statute).
179. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1853 (2017).
180. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rules for Bush Officials in Post–9/11 Suit, N.Y. 
Times (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/supreme-court-9-11-
bush-ashcroft-mueller.html; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline 
of the Right to Redress, 86 Fordham L.R. 2167, 2169 (2018).
181. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 at 1853.
182. Id. at 1863.
183. Id. at 1872. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s narrow interpretation of 
the Bivens action).
184. Id. at 1884.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (“We have applied the Constitution to actions taken during periods of war 
and national-security emergency.”).
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Codifying an expansion of the Bivens claim may be necessary in the future to 
ensure some type of monetary remedy for wrongful detention from federal 
officials based on race.
V. Recommendations for Legislation and Congressional Action
Though courts have every constitutional and interpretative tool to assert 
that Korematsu is no longer precedent, legislation remains essential to ensure 
the protection of civil rights and liberties in times of national distress.  Despite 
the immediate pushback from the Korematsu decision by legal experts,188 no 
legislative measure has been taken to permanently guard against mass incar-
ceration based on race.  While the Non-Detention Act requires Congressional 
approval prior to detention, the AUMF and the NDAA have created murky 
waters for the judiciary to wade through in the event of detaining Ameri-
can citizens.  Though a constitutional amendment would be the best practical 
solution, practically, a constitutional amendment would likely not be able to 
be ratified in this political climate.  Accordingly, legislation is necessary and 
practical to substantiate the assertion that civil rights and liberties do not, and 
should not, die in the face of war.
A. Amending the Non-Detention Act
The Non-Detention Act was enacted to repeal parts of the Internal 
Security Act of 1950, specifically the “Emergency Detention Act.”189  The 
Emergency Detention Act authorized the federal government to detain any 
person suspected of espionage or sabotage when there was a declared state of 
emergency.190  Two years after the bill was passed, Attorney General Howard 
McGrath selected six potential detainment camps on United States soil.191 
The camps were never used.192  Five years later, the Government defunded 
the camps; however, the Emergency Detention Act remained valid for twenty 
years until the Non-Detention Act was signed into law by President Richard 
Nixon in 1971.193
In response to the looming effects of the Emergency Detention Act, 
President Nixon signed the Non-Detention Act to relieve the American 
public’s panic that internment camps would be utilized to detain other ethnic 
188. See generally, Eugene v. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 
54 Yale L.J. 489 (1945) (asserting only a few years after the Korematsu decision that the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of Japanese aliens was “hasty, unnecessary, and mistaken.”).
189. Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1971).
190. Brian Niiya, Emergency Detention Act, Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 
Densho Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Emergency_Detention_Act%2C_
Title_II_of_the_Internal_Security_Act_of_1950 (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Masumi Izumi, Repeal of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (“Emergency 
Detention Act”), Densho Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Repeal_of_Title_
II_of_the_Internal_Security_Act_of_1950_%28%22Emergency_Detention_Act%22%29 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
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groups and those who held unpopular beliefs.194  The Non-Detention Act 
states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United 
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”195
Prior to promulgating the effects of the Non-Detention Act, during 
World War II, the Government frequently argued that national security was 
so urgent that there was not enough time to properly screen the disloyal Jap-
anese Americans from the loyal ones.196  However, Justice Jackson pointed 
out in Korematsu that the Government conducted individual screenings for 
German Americans and Italian Americans prior to detention.197  This further 
proves that the American government had the means to conduct individual 
screenings instead of issuing categorical racial exclusionary orders.  In sup-
port of Justice Jackson’s statement, the Commission’s Report noted that the 
Government misled the Court about the military necessity of detention with-
out due process.  Despite Justice Jackson’s argument and the contents of the 
Commission’s Report, Congress approved of President Roosevelt’s Executive 
Order, EO 9066, and reaffirmed it with federal law, specifically Public Law 503. 
This is proof that Congressional authorization through screening individuals 
in the midst of war does not necessarily prohibit constitutional violations. 
Instead, a proactive amendment would prohibit this from reoccurring.
A proactive amendment codifying the Supreme Court’s plurality hold-
ing in Hamdi would clarify the Non-Detention Act.  Under the current statute, 
citizens may not be detained without Congressional authorization; however, it 
would be vastly beneficial to amend the Non-Detention Act to include: “All cit-
izens are entitled to contest their status in front of a neutral decision maker.” 
Hamdi’s ruling only received a plurality vote; thus, a complementary statute 
strengthening the protection of habeas corpus is necessary.  By amending the 
Non-Detention Act to include the right for a person to contest the status as an 
enemy combatant, or a terrorist, or other similar labels, Congress guarantees 
that some type of hearing with representation will at least occur before deten-
tion, rather than an indefinite detention without representation.  However, 
including language that guarantees access to counsel may be superfluous since 
it does not appear to be controversial whether a person, once determined to be 
a citizen, will be given access to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
At the time of publication, Senator Tammy Duckworth, Senator Mazie 
Hirono, and Representative Mark Takano introduced The Korematsu-Takai 
Civil Liberties Protection Act of 2019 which codifies this amendment into the 
Non-Detention Act.198  The legislation acknowledges the horrors of Japanese 
194. Louis Fisher, Detention of U.S. Citizens, CRS Report for Congress (2005), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22130.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
195. Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (1971).
196. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 243.
198. Michelle Lou & Brandon Griggs, Three Asian-American Lawmakers Introduce 
a Bill to Prohibit Internment Like That of Japanese Americans During World War II, CNN 
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/20/politics/japanese-internment-law-trnd/
index.html.
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American internment camps and prevents Americans form being incarcer-
ated based on their race or religion.199  This bill was originally introduced in 
2017, but it died in committee.200
B. Defunding Executive Orders
Congress may pass legislation to defund any executive order that the 
president issues that would lead to mass internment based on race.  Article I 
of the Constitution grants Congress full power over the collection and expen-
diture of public funds.201  For instance, in the case of Korematsu, Congress 
could have voted to defund the military budget necessary for a “military area.”
This type of pushback has happened more recently during President 
Barack Obama’s term.  At the beginning of his presidency, President Obama 
attempted to close the Guantanamo Detention Facility in Cuba through an 
executive order.202  In response, Congress stripped away the funds essential to 
effectuating the executive order happen.203  Guantanamo Bay remains open 
at the time of publication.204
With respect to immigration policies, President Obama signed an exec-
utive order that allowed five million undocumented persons to remain in 
the United States without the threat of deportation.  The majority in the 
House of Representatives were unhappy with this executive order and coun-
teracted it by passing an appropriation bill that decreased funding for the 
Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, and research and 
development while increasing funding for the Customs and Border Protec-
tion, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Secret Service.205
Similar to the efforts to stop President Obama’s executive orders, 
defunding Executive Order 9066 would have blocked the Japanese Ameri-
can internment camps from being built.  Moreover, defunding Proclamation 
9645 could have had an impact on the immigration courts.  Thus, future Con-
gressional action could aim at defunding any presidential action that favored 
zoning areas for detention centers.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Kevin Kosar, Six Ways Congress Can Curb a Runaway President, Politico (Jan. 
21, 2017, 7:59 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/01/six-ways-congress-can-
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2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21detain.html.
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204. See Julian Borger, Donald Trump Signs Executive Order to Keep Guantanamo 
Bay Open, The Guardian (Jan. 30, 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/
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205. Rebecca Shabad & Cristina Marcos, House Passes Bill to Defund Obama’s 
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C. Congressional Declaration Against Internment
A Congressional proclamation or resolution against American citi-
zen internment, detention, or racialized exclusionary orders would be very 
powerful in future judicial interpretations.  According to the Youngstown 
doctrine, the Presidential power is weakest when it contradicts Congressional 
directions.206  When Congress is silent, then the President has more leeway to 
use “his own independent powers” and the law may be too uncertain for judi-
cial interpretation.207
Each branch has issued a statement or passed legislation rebuking 
the governmental actions taken during World War II against the Japanese 
Americans.  In 1976, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order that 
overturned Executive Order 9066.208  President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Civil Liberties Act in 1988 that provided compensation to more than 100,000 
Japanese American people who suffered in internment camps during World 
War II.209  Then-Solicitor General Neal Katyal issued the Confession of Error 
on behalf of the Department of Justice.210  However, these actions were all 
retroactive and apologetic rather than proactive and protective of future 
constitutional violations in the midst of war.  Congress must unequivocally 
declare its stance against American citizen internment without due process, 
binding the president to the will of Congress in all future cases.  As a result, 
the judiciary will have no choice but to deem detention based on race illegal 
and unconstitutional.
Conclusion
Seventy-three years later, Korematsu has reentered the political dia-
logue in the wake of President Trump’s Executive Order calling for a travel 
ban on predominantly Muslim countries and the immigration detention camps 
on the Texas border.  Generally, legal experts have considered Korematsu all 
but dead due to its anticanonicity.  However, Korematsu left a loaded weapon 
for this Supreme Court to use: the mask of national security to hide racial 
and religious animus.  Not only did the Supreme Court reload this weapon, 
but Chief Justice Roberts attempted to confuse the American public by over-
ruling Korematsu in his majority opinion dicta.  Chief Justice Roberts’ failed 
attempt ultimately “replaced one gravely wrong decision with another.”211
206. Redlich, supra note 148, at 233.
207. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
208. Proclamation No. 4417, 41 F.R. 35 (Feb. 20, 1976).
209. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50a U.S.C. § 1989(b) (1988).
210. Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-
American Internment Cases, The United States Department of Justice Archives (May 
20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor- generals-
mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases(last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
211. Trump, 585 U.S. at 21 (2018) (quoting J. Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion). Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018).
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The Korematsu Court had severe gaps in reasoning at the time the case 
was decided and should have applied strict scrutiny to the military orders. 
The dissenting opinions expose the fragile narrative shaped by the majority 
to protect the exclusionary orders.  Consequently, Korematsu has entered the 
anticanon for its poor legal reasoning that is supported by racial and ethnic 
profiling.  Perhaps one day, another seventy years from now, the Supreme 
Court will expose Trump v. Hawaii for its poor reasoning and the mental 
gymnastics the Trump Administration went through to pass his third version 
of the travel ban.
Moreover, Korematsu’s precedent has no binding authority due to the 
subsequent cases like Hamdi that have eroded it.  Hamdi demands that all per-
sons are guaranteed a hearing in front of a neutral decision maker to contest 
their status as an enemy combatant.  Additionally, no other case has enforced 
Korematsu as good law.  Recent cases such as Ziglar and Hedges focus on 
different issues, but the Court affirmed that no law permits the detention of 
American citizens without Congressional authorization.
Therefore, Congressional action is required to prohibit history from 
repeating itself, which Congress has proven ready to do.  Even though the 
Supreme Court referenced Korematsu as invalid, Congress should continue 
to recognize the national mistake of internment of American citizens and 
permanently disarm the loaded weapon Justice Jackson so aptly warned us 
about by refusing to hide behind the “talisman” of national security.
